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In the past, research has considered what types of structures and settings influence 
cooperation and emotions in social dilemmas.  However, there is little examination about 
how a crisis or change in the situation affects emotions. This study predicted that 
stronger emotions will form when groups are presented with a crisis versus emotions 
formed in groups that are not presented with a crisis.  The groups were comprised of four 
individuals who participated in a public goods activity.  Once group members finished 
the group activity, they completed a questionnaire measuring their emotions towards 
their group members.  My hypothesis was supported; stronger emotions were present in 
the groups that were presented with a crisis versus the groups that were not presented 
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The study of social dilemmas has been important to most of the social sciences, 
including sociology, psychology, economics and political science.  Social dilemmas 
occur when an individual is faced with a situation where his or her short term motives 
conflict with the group’s overall motives (Dawes, 1980).  Social dilemmas can be broken 
down into two more specific types: public goods and resource goods.  Public goods are 
where individuals are faced with the decision of whether or not to contribute; where as 
with resource goods, individuals are faced with the decision of whether to consume or 
not (Sell, 2007). In this study we examine only public goods.  Specifically, we will ask 
whether crises or events in which situations change quickly lead to higher group identity 
and affiliation with the group. 
 
Public goods  
All public goods have a few very important defining qualities.  First, the situation must 
be non-excludable, meaning that no matter if an individual chooses to cooperate or not, 
that individual will still benefit from the good in the same way as any other individual in 
the group.  For example, to reduce pollution, members of a community are asked to walk 
or ride bicycles instead of using motorized vehicles as a means of transportation. In this 
situation, each individual is left with the decision to defect and continue to use a 
 




motorized vehicle as his or her means of transportation or to cooperate and find another 
means of transportation that does not contribute pollution.  Even if the individual 
chooses to continue to use motorized vehicles as a means of transportation, that 
individual will still benefit from the reduction in pollution if others in the community 
choose to cooperate.  In the same sense, if an individual chooses to cooperate and finds 
another means of transportation, but others in the community do not; the pollution 
problem is not solved and so the individual that cooperates fails along with the rest of 
the members in the community.  The second defining quality a public good possesses is 
the fact that all the individuals will receive a higher payoff if all cooperate instead of all 
the individuals defecting (Dawes, 1980).  In the example used above it can be shown that 
if all members use an alternate form of transportation that does not contribute to the 
pollution, then all members of the community receive the higher payoff of clean air; 
where as, if all members choose to defect and continue to use transportation that 
contributes to the pollution, then all of the members will receive a lower payoff from the 
ramifications of the high pollution.  This example also proves why social dilemmas are 
important to study.  Looking at the big picture, social dilemmas help solve large issues 
such as the depletion of water or the environment.  Social dilemmas are not just large 
issues; they can also be as small as a community raising money for a new public park.  
However big or small the dilemma is, it is still important to learn how people come 






Social dilemma structure 
In the past, there have been two main structures of focus regarding social dilemmas: the 
two-person dilemma, also known as the prisoner’s dilemma, and the N-person dilemma.  
Dawes (1980) laid out three characteristics that a two-person dilemma usually does not 
have in common with an N-person dilemma.  First, in an N-person dilemma the harm 
from defecting is spread out over all the other individuals in the group and therefore 
harder to identify than in a two-person dilemma where the harm for defection is focused 
only on the other person.  Second, there is the factor of anonymity in an N-person 
dilemma where as in the two-person dilemma there is no question in how the other 
individual has behaved.  Finally, it is more complicated for an individual to punish or 
reward another participant’s behavior for cooperating or defecting in an N-person 
dilemma than in a two-person dilemma (Dawes, 1980).  For the purpose of this study, 
individuals will be participating in an N-person dilemma and therefore aspects of a two-
person dilemma will not be included any further.   
 
An important aspect of a social dilemma that affects the degree of free-riding is the 
incentive structure.  To measure how payoff properties or incentives affect cooperation, 
Isaac and Walker (1988) used the marginal per capita return (MPCR).  Studies have 
found that MPCR has been effective in measuring cooperation and that the higher the 





Repeated public goods decisions and one time only public good decisions also create 
different incentives for participants.  In repeated decision situations, participants can 
punish other members for not contributing in one exchange situation by not contributing 
in the next exchange situation (Sell 2007).  Obviously this is not possible if participants 
are only acting once.  Because we are studying group identity, we will focus on repeated 
decision making settings.  
 
There is a controversy in the literature about the nature of social identity and how it 
might affect cooperation (Jin and Yamagishi, 1997; Simpson 2004).  We do not have to 
enter this controversy however, because the question of interest is whether certain 




Social dilemmas are solved and people do choose to cooperate over defect.  But why do 
people cooperate?  After reviewing the literature on social dilemmas it has been assumed 
that participants will focus only on their own outcomes but it has been found that many 
participants do account for what other participants receive.  Brewer (2007) developed the 
theory of optimal distinctiveness.  This theory argues that humans have always had to 
rely on groups in the past for survival.  Two needs have evolved from this reliance on 
groups: the need for inclusion and assimilation and the need for differentiation.  This, 




need the individual chooses to fulfill.  In Andreoni’s (1995) article Warm-Glow Versus 
Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in 
Experiments, he suggests that with public goods there is a positive externality.  His 
experimental study supported the fact that subjects are more willing to cooperate when 
the externality is positive even though the potential outcomes are the same.   
 
Additionally, we know that individual differences can matter.  Simpson (2004) examined 
the difference between individualists and prosocials in situations that require 
cooperation.  He assigned social values to the terms individualists and prosocials; where 
individualists focus on their own benefits and prosocials focus on maximizing equality 
for all the players.  He found that consistently, prosocials are more cooperative that 
individualists.  Through these studies, it can be assumed that the best possible situation 
for cooperation would be where the members of the group focus on their need for 
inclusion and assimilation, the externality is positive and the members are prosocials.  If 
these situations promote cooperation, then what kinds of situations form emotions and 
do these emotions lead to cooperation? 
 
Emotion 
Lawler and his colleague have developed differing theories connecting emotion to social 
exchange situations.  This area of research has found that successful exchanges lead to 
positive emotions.  In his study in 1996, he establishes the idea of an “emotional down” 




reach agreements within an exchange and results in emotions such as disappointment, 
upset and unsatisfactory feelings.  An emotional buzz is developed when the participants 
complete exchanges with one another and these exchanges are successful and they feel 
energized and happy.  Once the participants feel that they have unified with one another 
through the exchanges, they are more likely to trust each other.  This trust then leads 
them to expect or predict more exchanges that result in cooperation, invest in the 
relationship that they have built and ultimately engage in risky or costly situations to 
uphold their relationship (Lawler and Yoon 1996).  Therefore, the opportunity for more 
money is not the only factor responsible for emotions, but just gaining an emotional buzz 
from a successful exchange with their partner can be enough motivation for cooperation.  
In Lawler and Yoon’s discussion, they conclude that if participants get an emotional 
uplift from participating in successful joint exchanges, this creates the feeling of joining 
in something larger.  However, this study only looked at negotiated exchange situations 
between two people.  In 2008 Lawler, Thye and Yoon examined whether positive or 
negative emotions result from N-person groups who experience positive or negative 
exchanges with one another.  They predicted that because each participant now has to 
focus on two or more people instead of just one, when successful exchanges occur this 
accomplishment will be perceived as more significant.  Therefore, they predicted it 
might be possible that stronger emotions will result from exchanges that involve more 
than two participants.  They found that the more participants exchanged with each other, 








The effect of uncertainty has also been investigated in Lawler and Yoon’s (1996) study, 
where they formed the emotional buzz theory.  They discovered that the emotional buzz 
becomes stronger when uncertainty is added in the mix.  If participants do not know that 
he or she is working in a group or do not know anything about those who are in the 
group, the emotions or feelings that result from completing the task at hand will be 
stronger and easier to identify. They did this by studying different two-party negotiation 
settings where the participants did not know each other and were negotiating over a 
computer.  Kollock (1994) also demonstrated how feelings connect with uncertainty.  At 
the end of his experiment, the participants filled out a questionnaire.  Participants applied 
more extreme characteristics to their partners when the exchanges had an element of 
uncertainty.  Kollock observed further that after the study, the participants who 
participated in exchanges wanted to meet each other and when they did, they interacted 
as old friends.  To continue with the research on what makes emotions stronger or 
weaker in exchange situations, I plan to look at how a transformative crisis affects 
emotions in exchange situations.  A transformative crisis is an abrupt break where 
information becomes incomplete and therefore, when present, will create a sense of 




groups presented with a crisis situation will form stronger positive emotions towards the 







Texas A&M undergraduate students were recruited for the opportunity to participate in 
the study.  If the student was interested, he or she filled out an information sheet 
including his or her name, number, classification, age, gender, schedule and a list of 
studies that they have previously participated in to ensure that they have not participated 
in similar studies. 
 
Settings and procedures 
Once the students had indicated they were interested in participating in the study, they 
were contacted by telephone and scheduled to come into the lab with 7 other interested 
students.  Once in the lab, each participant was required to read over and sign the 
informed consent sheet. Along with explaining the procedures, each informed consent 
sheet also informed the participant that he or she could leave the study at any time and 
still receive their money compensation (see appendix A for the IRB approval; see 
appendix B for the informed consent).  Participants were also informed that they would 
receive their compensation for participating privately after the completion of the study. 
 
Before the participants arrived, the researches randomly assigned groups to either the 
crisis situation or the non-crisis situation.  Each group consisted of 4 participants, and to 




participants.  Additionally, the researchers ensured that there were not groups that 
consisted of only one sex.  This controls for participants being able to conclude that 
there group was either all men or all women.  (We know this to be an important aspect of 
public goods studies based on prior research.  See Sell et al, 1993 and Sell and Son 
1997.)  After the participants completed the informed consent they were informed that 
they would be required to complete a worksheet. Each participant was given his or her 
own iPod touch.  Beforehand, an application that was designed specifically for the study 
for loaded onto each iPod.  All the participants were briefed on how to use the 
application correctly and then the study was explained.  After the explanation, the 
participants were given the opportunity to do three practice trials to ensure they 
understood the study and how to use the iPod touch application. 
 
On the iPod touch, each participant would be able to see their own private fund which 
had 100 tokens deposited each round.  Each token was equivalent to 1 cent.  Each 
participant could also see the group fund which started with 0 tokens at the beginning of 
every round.  In each round, each participant would decide whether to contribute any or 
all of their tokens to the group fund (cooperate) or to keep some or all in their private 
fund (defect).  The tokens that remained in the participant’s private fund remained worth 
1 cent but the tokens that were transferred to the group fund became worth 3 cents but 
were divided evenly between all 4 group members at the end of each round.  The number 




3 practice trials) and was determined randomly at the beginning of the study.  At the 
beginning of each round, participants were given the following instructions: 
At the beginning of each decision period 100 tokens will 
be placed in your private fund. You have two choices as to 
what you can do with these tokens.   
 
The first option is to contribute tokens into the group fund. 
Each token contributed to the group fund is worth three 
cents, and each token invested in the group fund is divided 
equally among the members of the group – no matter how 
much they contribute to the group.   In summary, 
regardless of your contributions as an individual, you 
always receive ¼ of the group fund.  
 
The second option is to keep your tokens in the private 
fund.  Each token added to the private fund is worth one 
cent.  It is added to your earnings and is not shared with 
the other group members. 
 
 
Throughout the study, each participant would keep his or her own record sheet to keep 
track of where they placed their tokens in each round (see appendix C).  Along with their 
record sheet, the iPod touch kept track of how much was in their private fund, how much 
was in the group fund and how much money they had earned total to throughout the 
study but were not able to see how much other members contributed.  At the end of the 
study, each participant was paid, in private, the amount that they had earned in the study. 
 
Independent variables 
Groups were assigned to be in either the Crisis or Non-Crisis Condition.  If participants 
were assigned to the non-Crisis condition, they were simply brought into the lab and 





If participants were assigned to the Crisis condition, they were first told that they would 
be in an individual study. They were informed that their compensation at the end of the 
study would be based on the accuracy and timeliness of the completion of the worksheet.  
The worksheet consisted of a few practice problems to prepare the participants for the 
next stage of the study along with various other simple math and verbal problems.  After 
participants had worked on their individual tasks for about 5 minutes, they were 
interrupted and told that they had been randomly selected to be interrupted and would be 
working together on a group study instead of the individualized study.  They were asked 
"Is there anybody who wishes to leave right now? If you leave right now you will be 
compensated for your time in the laboratory but lose the opportunity to help others in 
your group and potentially earn more money."  This is an intervention or crisis because it 
changes the definition of the situation and task and also emphasizes changes from 
individual group. 
 
Dependent variable and post experimental procedures 
Once the groups had completed the total number of rounds for their study, they were 
given a questionnaire to fill out (see appendix D for questionnaire).  On the 
questionnaire, the participants responded to 10 questions that were used to measure their 
emotions about the exchanges that took place during the experiment.  The questions 




study.  After completion of the questionnaire, each participant was privately given their 






Once all of the data was gathered, I ran a series of tests to determine if individuals in the 
crisis situations had stronger emotions than the non-crisis situations after the exchanges 
both participated in.  The first test I ran found the mean emotion score for each 
individual index item for both the crisis and non-crisis situation and is presented in Table 
1. 
 
































































In Table 1, every index item has a higher mean emotion score for the crisis.  To 
determine if all items can be combined in an index, I calculated, Cronbach’s Alpha, a 
measure of consistency. The Cronbach’s Alpha was .932 which indicates the 10 items 




overall mean was the sum of the individual questions that measured the individual’s 
feelings regarding his or her exchanges with the group during the experiment.  The 
individuals received a score ranging between 10 and 110 depending on how he or she 
rated his or her feelings. The higher the number, the more positive an individual’s 
emotions were; the lower the number, the more negative an individual’s emotions were.  
The means are depicted below in Table 2 and show the predicted pattern: individuals in 
the crisis situation reported more positive emotions than those in the non-crisis situation.   
 
Table 2.  Comparison of Non-Crisis and Crisis 
 Condition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
  t Probability of t 
Non-Crisis 77.2 15.7     
        2.58 .01 
Crisis 83.3 15.4     
 
 
Those participants who were presented with no change in situation, had an overall mean 
of 77.2.  Those participants who were presented with the change of the situation or 
“crisis,” had an overall mean of 83.25.  The t-test comparing the means for the non-crisis 
versus the means for the crisis conditions 2.58 with an associated probability of .01 in 
the predicted direction (shown in Table 2).  This means that the participants in the crisis 




Therefore, my hypothesis was supported and those participants who were presented with 
the crisis had stronger positive emotions than those participants who were not presented 






I had suggested that sudden changes in the definition of the situation lead to differences 
in individuals’ feelings about the groups with which they interact.  When participants 
thought that they were acting only as individuals, but were interrupted and then 
interacted with a group on an interdependent task, they seem to have greater positive 
affect for their group than did participants who were always acting in groups. The results 
supported my hypothesis.  This lends support to the idea that transformations in social 
dilemma settings lead to more positive affect for group members.  In the future, it might 
be important to investigate how these emotions affect other behaviors.  For example, do 
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 Recruitment Script—In Class 
My name is _________ and I am here to tell you about some studies that we are 
conducting in the Department of Sociology and to invite you to volunteer to participate 
in these studies.  You will have the opportunity to see how sociologists conduct research, 
and to be paid for your participation. I can not tell you exactly what study you might be 
in or exactly what you will be paid because we are recruiting for several different studies 
right now.  But I can tell you that some of our studies pay up to $20.00 for as little as one 
hour of your time. Other studies are short questionnaire studies that may take only half 
an hour and those usually pay around 7-10 dollars. 
 
In a minute, I will hand out these sign up sheets [HOLD SIGN UP SHEET SO CLASS 
CAN SEE IT], which ask for your name, telephone number and the times most 
convenient for you to participate. If you decide to sign up, we will call you sometime in 
the next few weeks to schedule a time.  We can give you information about the specific 
study, pay and time, location, etc, when we call to schedule you.  At that time, you can 
agree to participate or to be removed from our pool.  You will notice that we also ask 
some other questions about your experiences, for example, if you have any certifications 
that involve emergency actions (such as EMT or Paramedic training).  This is because 
we are doing a series of studies that involve asking people to remember certain 
emergency events they have been trained to deal with. 
 
Now, you may have heard stories about experiments that actually caused people to have 
negative experiences.  There is a famous study, for example – the Milgrom study – in 
which people thought they were sending electric shocks to other people and hurting 
them.  They were not really, but they thought they were. Today, that experiment is 
considered to have ethical problems because people suffered psychological trauma just 
from being in the study. I want to assure you that nothing like this is going on in our 
studies. Partly because of problems in past experiments, new federal guidelines were 
developed for all studies that use human subjects.  Here at A&M, all our studies go 
through the human subjects review board (called the IRB).  Importantly, if you should 
ever feel uncomfortable while in ANY study, you should just leave. 
 
Another thing I want to make sure you understand is that you are not obligated in any 
way to sign up.  You participation has nothing to do with this class. Dr. (Fill in 
professor’s name) won’t know if you come or if you  don’t come.  There is no extra 
credit for participation.  So, just because I show up here in your class, don’t feel 
obligated to sign up.  If you are interested and would like to participate, please fill out 
the form and pass it in to me.  If you are not interested, simply hand the form back. 
 
I appreciate your help. 
 









 Telephone Script for Scheduling 
 
Hello.  This is __________________, and I am calling from the Social Psychology Lab  
at Texas A&M University. May I please speak to 
________________________________?   
 
 
[if speaker is not __________________________, wait for 
________________________________, then re-identify self as above. If __________ is 
not available, ask when would be a good time to call back. If information is not 
available, than answerer and say good bye. On contact info sheet, write time/date of call, 
and that roommate answered. If time to call back was available write that too.] 
 
Earlier in the semester, in one of your classes, (OR earlier today, last week, yesterday, as 
appropriate) you were invited to participate our paid research studies and you indicated 
that you were interested in participating. I am calling to now to follow up on that. 
 





Let me quickly tell you about this study: It takes place on campus, in the Academic 
Building, and lasts about (put time in here). You can expect to earn from (put in Amount 
here). You will be asked to work on (put relevant information here about the study). The 
research asks no questions that are sensitive or personal. You participation is completely 
voluntary. If you do volunteer, you may refuse to answer any individual question and 
you have the right to withdraw your participation at any time.  
 
[Note: use information from sign up sheet regarding convenient time for subject]  
 
Would you be able to make it at ________________(time) on _____________(day)? 
 
[If YES: go to confirmation; if NO . . .] 
 
How about ________________(time) on _____________(day)? 
 
[If YES: go to confirmation; if NO . . .] 
 
Could you make it at ___________________ on ___________________? 
 
[If YES: go to confirmation; if NO, continue reading next each available time, in 





Confirmation: Great!  Why don’t you get a pencil while I put you on our schedule? 
 
[When subject has pencil and paper] 
 
You have been scheduled to participate in a study that takes place at ____________ on 
________________.  The study will take place in room 305 of the Academic Building.  
That’s on the third floor.   
 
Do you know where that is?   
 
[If not, Directions: Academic Building is the one with the big dome, behind 
Evans Library.  If you go to the Ross statute, you’ll see the dome on the building 
right behind it.  We are on the third floor. There will be signs posted leading to 
305. 
 
Thank you again for agreeing to participate.  I, or someone else from the lab will call 
you the day before your scheduled time to leave a reminder. 
 




[Make sure to place the participant’s first name only and phone number in the Google 
calendar. Once two persons are scheduled for a given time, not that in the title of the 
time block so it is visible without opening the time block. Remove the contact info sheet 





Individual or Experimental:  You will simply be answering some questions and will be 
paid according to your responses.  This can take different amounts of time, but people do 




Control:  you will be working with a group of people.  You pay depends on what you 
and other group members do.  This can take different amounts of time, but the study 
does not usually take more than an hour.  The pay varies from about 5 to 25 dollars for 





Social Dilemma Study 
 
You have been asked to participate in a study concerning the ways in which 
people solve problems.  You were selected to be a possible participant because you 
volunteered your contact information when one of our researchers spoke to your class 
earlier this semester.  The study will involve approximately 660 people and will be 
conducted in rooms located in the Academic Building.    The purpose of this study is to 
examine how people make decisions in group settings. 
 If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to work with 3 other people to 
make decisions.  We will also be asking you to fill out some questionnaires concerning 
the study.  Other than the financial compensation, there are no direct risks or benefits to 
being a participant in this study. You do not have to answer any questions that make you 
feel uncomfortable. 
 There is variation in how long this study will take.   Most studies take from forty 
minutes to an hour and a half.  Your earnings depend upon how you and your group 
members make decisions.  Therefore, your pay can vary from about 5 dollars to about 25 
dollars.  If you are uncomfortable during the study you may stop at any time.  If you 
stop, you will earn the amount up to the time you stop. 
 This study is confidential.  Although your first name will be used on decision 
recording sheet, no identifiers linking you to the study will be included in any sort of 
report that might be published.  Only the researchers associated with this study will have 
access to your written records.   
 This study is not associated with any class at Texas A&M University. There will 
be no class credit involved, and your participation in this study will not affect your 
grades now or in any future classes at Texas A&M University.  
 This research study has been reviewed by the Human Subjects’ Protection 
Program and/or the Institutional Review Board at Texas A&M University.  For research-
related problems or questions regarding your rights as a research participant, you can 
contact these offices at (979)458-4067 or irb@tamu.edu. 
 Please be sure you have read the above information, asked questions and 
received answers to your satisfaction.  You will be given a copy of the consent form for 
your records.  By signing this document, you consent to participate in this study. 
 
 
__________________________________   __________________ 




Signature of Researcher 
If you have any further questions, feel free to contact Dr. Jane Sell, Sociology 








1. Suppose that you invest 80 tokens in the group fund and keep 20 tokens in 
your private fund.  If the group fund total is 240 (your 80 tokens plus 
theother members’ total group investiment of 160 more), then what would 





2. Suppose that you keep all 100 tokens in your private fund.  Further, suppose 






3. Suppose you keep 60 tokens in your private fund and invest 40 tokens in the 
group fund.  If the group fund totals 120 (your 40 plus the other members’ 









The study in which you will participate concerns how people in groups make 
decisions. You are one member of a group of four people. Everyone in the group 
will be making the same kinds of decision. The people in your group may be in 
this room or they may be in another room. You will not be able to speak to the 
other members of your group. This is because we are interested in how people 
interact in environments in which they cannot see each other or interact face-to-
face. Each member will make a number of decisions and record them on the green 
sheets we gave you when you came in. At the end of the study you will be paid, in 
private, the amount that you have earned.  
 
The decision that you will be making concern what to do with 100 tokens that 
will be put into a PRIVATE FUND for every decision.  
 
You will be working with the same group members for all decisions in this study. 
At the beginning of each decision period, 100 tokens are put into a private fund.  
Then, you have 2 choices about what to do with the tokens in the private fund.  
 
The first choice involves INVESTING tokens in the group fund. Each token 
invested in the group fund is worth 3 cents and each token in this fund is evenly 
divided among all members of the group—no matter how much they invest in the 
group fund. That is, regardless of what you do as an individual, you always 
receive ¼ share of the group fund.  
 
The second choice involves KEEPING tokens in the private fund. Every token 
put in your private fund is worth 1 cent. This is added directly to your earnings—





For every decision period, you may invest up to 100 tokens in the group fund and 
instead keep up to 100 tokens in your private fund.  
 
Let’s go through some examples so that it is clear how you make a decision and 
the outcomes of the decision are determined.  
 
As an example, suppose during one decision you invest no tokens in the group 
fund and instead keep all 100 tokens in your private fund. (On your record sheet, 
you would show your decision by putting 0 in the column marked ‘Group 
Fund.’).  On the itouch you would enter 100 when asked how much you wish to 
contribute to the group fund.  
 
After you have made a decision, you will enter your decision on the itouch.  After 
you enter your decision, a computer spread sheet will generate the results and 
send them back to you.  When the results are sent back, please copy down your 
results on the record sheet in front of you. Based on all the decision by the people 
in your group, you will find out how many tokens are in which funds, and 
consequently what everyone will earn.  
 
Suppose the other 3 group members invest a total of 240 tokens in the group fund. 
How much would you earn? To figure this out, you take the 100 tokens you kept 
in the private fund and multiply that by 1 cent. This equals $1.00. Then we take 
the 240 tokens in the group fund and multiply that by 3 cents. This equals 720. 
Since all group members receive an equal share of this, every members share is 





As a second example, suppose during one decision you invest all 100 of your 
tokens in the group fund. (You would show this decision by marking through the 
100 tokens in the private fund and indicating 0. Then you would mark 100 in the 
Group Fund column.) Now, suppose that the other group members invest 
another 60 tokens to the group fund. Thus the group fund equals 160 tokens. The 
160 tokens in the group fund is multiplied by 3 cents to equal 480. Since all group 
members receive an equal share of this, your share is 480/4, which equals 120 or 
$1.20. So, for this decision you earn 0 (private fund) and $1.20 in the group fund 
which equals $1.20.  
 
Just to make sure that you understand the two types of investments, please work 
through the examples on the yellow piece of paper on your desk. When you are 
finished, please raise your hand and one of the researchers will collect the sheet. 




Now how and what will happen in every decision period? 
 
First, for all trials, mark on your green sheet whether you wish to invest any of 
your tokens in your private fund to the group fund. You will then ALSO enter in 
your decision in the itouch. 
 
After all group member have entered their decision, your will be able to see the 
sum of all members’ investment in the group fund, your individual earnings for 
each trial and your balance. When you get this information, please copy it down 





So, after each decision, you will enter your decision on the itouch, then after all 
group members have entered their decision, you will be given information about 
your earnings for each trial. 
 
Now, how many times will you be asked to make the decisions? Well, we are 
studying situations where the amount of interaction is uncertain. So, all we can 
tell you is that you will make more than one decision. You may be making quite a 
few decisions or you make me making only a few.  
Summary 
 
We will begin the study in a moment. 
 
You are working in groups of 4. Some of the people you are working with may be 
in this room or they may be in another room. 
 
I will announce each period. 
 
You can invest tokens in a group fund in which every group members receive an 
equal share. Each token in this fund is multiplied by 3 and then divided by 4 to 
determine individual shares.  
 
You can keep tokens in your private fund in which each token is worth 1 cent and 
is only yours. 
 





You will have more than one decision. 
 
Let’s begin. This is Decision 1. Please write down on your sheet how many, if 
any, tokens you want to take from your Private Fund and put it in the space 
where it says Group Fund.  After you have done this, enter your decision on 
your itouch. After everyone in your group has responded, you will then be able to 
see the sum of what other group members have invested in the group fund and 
your earnings.  
Are there any questions? 
If you should have any questions about the itouch, raise your hand and one of the 












ant #  
You are one member of a group of 4 people 
Period 
# Tokens I keep 
in the Private 
Fund 
# Tokens I 




















         70          30        $0,90      $1.60      $6.00 
  1       
  2       
  3       
  4       







ant #  
You are one member of a group of 4 people 
Period 
# Tokens I keep 
in the Private 
Fund 
# Tokens I 






Earnings for this 
period 
 Total 
  6       
  7       
  8       
  9       
  10       
  11       
 12       






You are one member of a group of 4 people 
Period 
# Tokens I keep 
in the Private 
Fund 
# Tokens I 






Earnings for this 
period 
 Total 
   14       
   15       
   16       
   17       
   18       
   19       
   20       





You are one member of a group of 4 people 
 
Period 
# Tokens I keep 
in the Private 
Fund 
# Tokens I 






Earnings for this 
period 
 Total 
   22       
   23       
   24       
   25       
   26       
   27       
   28       








These questions are referring to the task which you just completed.  When the question asks about 
the group, it is referring to the group which you were working with through the I touch. Please 
answer the following questions to the best of your ability. Please take care in considering your 
answers to each question.  Please circle the numbered response that best matches your opinion. 
1. For each of the following, please rate from -5 to 5 how you would best describe your group’s 
behavior. 
A. Very Unhelpful                    Neutral                                      Very Helpful 
      -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2           3        4     5 
 
B. Very Uncooperative                      Neutral       Very Cooperative 
-5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2           3        4     5 
 
 C. Very Self Oriented   Neutral                 Very Team Oriented 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 D. Very Unsupportive   Neutral                 Very Supportive 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
2.  For each of the following, please rate from -5 to 5 how you would best describe your feelings 
about the exchanges during the experiment.   
  
 A. Very Displeased   Neutral        Very Pleased 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 B. Very Unsatisfied   Neutral         Very Satisfied 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 C. Very Not Joyful   Neutral         Very Joyful 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 D. Very Bored   Neutral        Very Excited 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 E. Very Unmotivated   Neutral        Very Motivated 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 F. Very Unhappy       Neutral                   Very Happy 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 G. Very Discontented  Neutral        Very Contented 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
H. Very Unenthusiastic                  Neutral         Very Enthusiastic 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
I. Very Tired    Neutral         Very Energetic 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 




  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 
3. For each of the following, please rate from -5 to 5 how you would best describe the final outcome 
of your group’s efforts. 
 
A. Very Unsuccessful    Neutral           Very Successful 
   -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 B. Very Unproductive       Neutral            Very Productive 
   -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 C. Very Not Rewarding                    Neutral   Very Rewarding 
   -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 D. Very Uncooperative                     Neutral            Very Cooperative 
   -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
4.  For the following, please use the scale ranging from -5 to 5 to best answer each question. 
        
       A. How important is belonging to this group?  
None              Little                 Neutral          Some                  A lot 
   -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
B. How much does the outcome of the game matter to you?  
None              Little                Neutral          Some                  A lot 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
C. How close do you feel to group members?  
 None              Little              Neutral          Some                  A lot 
 -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2       3      4      5 
 
D. How closely do you identify with group members?  
None              Little                Neutral          Some                  A lot 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2      3     4      5 
 
E. How much did you trust the members in your group? 
None              Little                Neutral          Some                  A lot 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2      3      4      5 
 
F. In your opinion, how much do you share in common with the group?  
None              Little               Neutral          Some                  A lot 
 -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
G. How common are your goals to those of the group?  
None              Little                 Neutral           Some                  A lot 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4     5 
 
5. A list of statements follow, please indicate the choice that best represents your opinion about the 
statement. 





A) Strongly Agree   B) Agree  C) Neutral D) Disagree E) Strongly 
Disagree 
 
B. In the future, I would choose to work with another group before working with the same 
group I worked with today. 
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